Gabriel's, which takes ontology as the work's main concern, and my own, which reads Schelling as employing a practical strategy -and argues that each reveals serious limitations, recognition of which leads to a more comprehensive view of the work. 1 Dews goes on to conclude that, contra what Gabriel and I (each on different grounds) imply, the Freiheitsschrift does not succeed in its aim but rather falls between two stools, Schelling's deficiencies in 1809 pointing towards the great innovations of his late philosophy.
The common criticism that Dews makes of Gabriel and myself is that we neglect the vital methodological condition that Schelling lays down at the outset of the Freiheitsschrift, that a theory of freedom must both accord with the first-person perspective from within which we enjoy a feeling of freedom, and embed freedom in an objective system of concepts; one-sidedly, Gabriel takes the second route and I take the former. Dews's specific criticism of my interpretation is that it attributes to Schelling an argument inconsistent with the view of morality articulated in the Freiheitsschrift. The potential for dissonance to which Dews rightly draws attention is something I had overlooked and neglect of the relevant issues constitutes a weakness in my presentation, though I am not convinced that the implications for the interpretation itself are as serious as Dews suggests, for reasons that I will try to explain. Because the general issues surrounding Schelling's philosophical methodology and ethical theory deserve clarification on their own account, what follows may hold independent interest.
One potential source of resistance to the attribution to Schelling of a KantianFichtean style argument from first-person normative consciousness -not identified by Dews in so many words but perhaps in the vicinity of his concerns -derives from uncertainty that Schelling, in 1809 if not before, allows transcendental proof to be selfsupporting. The dual system approach which Schelling had adopted in 1800 allowed transcendental philosophy to proceed under its own steam, methodologically independent from Naturphilosophie, but by the time of the Freiheitsschrift, when both the dual system model and the Identity Philosophy's unification of the two systems have been left in abeyance, the picture has become unclear. In addition and more particularly, This goes right back to his 'Fichtean' texts of 1794-98, which give different indications concerning what is proven by the transcendental philosopher's discovery of an act of freedom at the core of self-consciousness. To be sure, the vacillations or at any rate variations in the weight Schelling puts on practical self-consciousness reflect the difficulties he encounters in completing his project of unifying Freedom and Nature, and to that extent I agree with Dews that the Freiheitsschrift lies under the shadow of a high-level lack of integration in Schelling's thought. The moral I would draw from this, however, is that, precisely because in 1809 Schelling still has no fixed and final account of a single philosophical method which would synthesize its Freedom-and Naturerelated, and its a priori and a posteriori aspects, Schelling does not preclude, rather he leaves scope for, a metaphysical derivation from practical self-consciousness, even if the results thereof stand in need of revalidation from a standpoint which is theoretical rather than practical and which does not confine itself to the transcendental method.
2 In short, Schelling's requirement that freedom be located in a system of concepts does not preclude an argument that extrapolates metaphysics from moral consciousness, even if he cannot allow it to be the whole story.
Dews's objection, however, is more finely focussed. It is that Schelling in 1809
'no longer thinks that there is any such thing as the normativity of pure practical reason'
and rejects the associated conception of 'the moral person as divided between transcendental freedom and the pull of empirical incentives', 3 and therefore cannot intend to argue in the way I propose. be taken up into maxims in order to yield reasons for action -must be relocated within it. And the parallel extends to the means which they employ to achieve this result: just as Schelling's unification of Freedom and Nature turns on a pre-empirical act of choice (the point made above), so too does Schiller's solution, in the argumentative heart of the Letters, turn on the postulation of a pre-empirical state of 'unlimited determinability' in the formation of our mental powers. 4 They agree, therefore, that the two dimensions of human personality that Kant painstakingly separates cannot, as they stand, be merely glued together or co-mingled, and that the unity of free moral agency must have its source (which Schelling locates in a choice coincident with the subject's creation and
Schiller in a retreat to pre-natal indetermination facilitated by aesthetic experience)
independently of and prior to the agent's empirical existence as a particular in nature. 5 In that sense, both uphold Kant's conception of a pure a priori foundation for normativity in general. And it is the manifestation of this pre-empirical ground in moral awareness that, in Schelling, gives normative consciousness its authority as a datum for metaphysical extrapolation.
The full importance of Nature for Schelling's argument, on my construal, emerges when we directly compare his theory of evil with Kant's. A fundamental point in Kant's argument is that we must avoid attributing to human beings an a priori interest in evil for its own sake: to attribute such a will to man is to make him either (i) a 'diabolical being', which his capacity for the good will precludes, or (ii) 'morally good and evil at the same time', which is contradictory. 6 An evil will must therefore not be understand as directed at its object qua evil. Hence Kant's claim that the opposition of good and evil can be represented only as a matter of the prioritization of one of two principles, the moral law and the principle of self-love, over the other. 7 Though the principles must stand on the same level, in so far as an intelligible choice is made between them, they are unequal in a key respect: the moral law expresses the ground of its own necessity (pure reason), whereas the agent's prioritization of the principle of self-love is groundless or rather whatever ground it may have is 'inscrutable'. The Kantian counter-claim is that any attempt to supply the allegedly missing insight -any greater degree of 'realism' about evil -will run foul of the absurdity of attributing a diabolical will; Kant's thesis of noumenal ignorance is consequently indispensable for the imputability of evil actions, just as his thesis of the transcendental ideality of empirical reality is indispensable for the attribution of freedom.
Schelling meets the challenge by employing Kant's own structure, but transposing it into an ontological key. Following Kant, Schelling plots the relation of good and evil along two dimensions: on the one (ontological groundedness) they are symmetrical, and on the other (rational warrant) they are not. This combination of symmetry and asymmetry is not left hanging, as in Kant, but provides the epistemic basis for, and is taken to derive metaphysically from, a corresponding combination in their ontological grounds. Each is aligned with a different relation of Grund and Existenz: in the case of the good, Existenz has precedence over Grund, in that of evil,
Grund has precedence over Existenz. These structures derive in turn from the inherent differences of Grund and Existenz, and the symmetry-and-asymmetry of their relation:
each grounds the other, according to Schelling's theory of God and Nature, but in inverse senses. The Grund-Existenz configuration, being metaphysically ultimate, closes all possibility of further explanation. It has thus been explained how it is possible for evil to figure positively in normative consciousness without imputing a diabolical will.
One crucial condition for Schelling to do all this is his rejection of a basic which is all-determining for the resulting metaphysics of morals: it is because the ordinary concept of a good will leads to the concept of a principle that motivates by virtue of its formal property of universality, that the moral law ultimately comes to be identified with autonomy. Schelling does not provide an analytic, but he leaves us in no doubt concerning the correct analysis of the concept of the Good: transposing Kant's identification of morality with universal law, the Freiheitsschrift aligns goodness and love with universality, and evil with particularity. Universality takes a different shape in Schelling -for whom it is, as said above, not first and foremost a property of a principle, but rather a matter of the form of an agent's selfhood -but he sustains the The Freiheitsschrift is, all too obviously, not a resource drawn on when contemporary philosophers (in the analytic tradition, at any rate) reflect on the problem of free will. Its present-day readers are those whose historical interest in classical German philosophy extends beyond the obvious landmarks of Kant and Hegel, and those, such as Žižek, who are constructing general philosophical positions of their own in dialogue with classical German thought. In this respect it is not on its own, however.
Contemporary discussion of freedom in the analytic anglophone sphere is almost completely dissociated from the classical German legacy. 10 As Dews indicates, the one element that has survived, due largely to P. F. Strawson, is the notion of the 'practical point of view', which Kant is widely supposed to have shown to be in some important way self-validating. Kant's intelligible causality has no place and is mentioned only, like
Schopenhauer's variant of the theory, as an absurdity to be avoided. Fichte's and Hegel's accounts of freedom, if they surface at all, do so in the context of rights and political theory. That more than half a century of intensive philosophical activity dedicated to establishing the possibility and actuality of human freedom should be taken to boil down to one fragmentary footnote in which Kant reports a provisional step in an
argument not yet completed -this surely demands explanation: How has it come about that one of the great developments in modern philosophy, which unified itself around the concept of freedom and devoted page after page to expositing the meaning and for the possibility of value, and (b) no methodological mistake is involved in attempting to elucidate or vindicate freedom through axiological reflection; (2) freedom, though necessarily expressed empirically, is independent from and immunized against empirical contingency -in the jargon, it belongs to the unconditioned; (3) freedom must pertain to the whole of human personality or to its deepest root, such that (a) the distinction between subjecthood and freedom is a conceptual and not a real distinction, and (b) if the attribute of freedom comes late in the metaphysical explication of what constitutes a human being, then its reality will to all effect have been denied rather than provided for.
Up to a point the conception is recognizably Kantian: transcendental freedom as Kant conceives it certainly satisfies (1) The whole thing comes down to this: from fatalism I immediately conclude against fatalism and everything connected with it. -If there are only efficient, but no final, causes, then the only function that the faculty of thought has in the whole of nature is that of observer; its proper business is to accompany the mechanism of the efficient causes. The conversation that we are now having together is only an affair of our bodies; and the whole content of the conversation, analysed into its elements, is extension, movement, degree of velocity, together with their concepts, and the concepts of these concepts. The inventor of the clock did not ultimately invent it; he only witnessed its coming to be out of blindly self-developing forces. So too Raphael, when he sketched the School of Athens, and Lessing, when he composed his Nathan. The same goes for all philosophizing, arts, forms of governance, sea and land wars -in brief, for everything possible. For affects and passions would have no effect either, so far as they are sensations and thoughts; or more precisely, so far as they carry sensations and thoughts with them. We only believe that we have acted out of anger, love, magnanimity, or out of rational decision. Mere illusion! What fundamentally moves us in all these cases is something that knows nothing of all that, and which is to this extent absolutely devoid of sensations and thoughts. These, the sensations and thoughts, are however only concepts of extension, movement, degrees of velocity, etc. -Now, if someone can accept this, then I cannot refute his opinion. But if one cannot, then one must be at the antipodes from Spinoza.
12
The particular interest of this passage, stripped of extraneous features, is Jacobi's notion of freedom as diffused throughout human personality, co-extensive with and constitutive of the total range of internal subject-constituting phenomena, such that denial of freedom would entail our elimination, or at any rate would leave us hollowed out, spiritless. Whether Kant need strictly disagree with anything Jacobi says here is uncertain, but in any case we do not find in Kant any similarly forthright affirmation of the foundational status and comprehensive reach of freedom.
The analysis I gave of the all-or-nothing conception of human freedom is only an approximation, 13 and a lengthy treatment would be required to substantiate the claim that it is original to and distinctive of classical German philosophy. 14 That said, it provides two things which are needed: a direct explanation for the non-relevance of classical German theories to contemporary discussion, and a basis on which we can identify what is specific to the way Schelling conceives freedom in the Freiheitsschrift.
To take the first of these: Although the all-or-nothing conception does not entail a commitment to indeterminism, it does rule out ab initio all forms of empirical compatibilism -the very type of position most widely believed to offer the best 21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 15 In addition, it means that a constructive speculative method of some sort, yielding metaphysical claims of a very general and most likely revisionary nature, is required if human freedom is to be grasped adequately. From such a perspective, contemporary discussion of human freedom, in which arguments characteristically turn on assertions and denials of conceptual connections between concepts extant in the manifest and/or scientific images, and which pursues metaphysical possibilities conservatively, within the constraints of one or other of those images, appear to be engaged in a circumscribed task located at a point relatively far downstream, and cannot be expected to do more than map assumptions which would avoid precluding the possibility of human freedom. That empirical compatibilism consistently proves the most stable (that is to say, the least awkward) position in contemporary debate comes as no surprise.
16
The specificity of the Freiheitsschrift -the contrast that it forms with other postKantian speculative theories of freedom -lies in Schelling's holding fast to a fundamental insight of Kant's and Jacobi's, namely that there is at the level of natural consciousness an opacity in freedom which is indicative of its metaphysical depth. This opacity is a corollary of the all-or-nothingness of freedom: it becomes explicit for us (per Jacobi) when our reflection seeks to grasp the ground of the phenomena that we take to manifest our freedom, or (per Kant) when we ask what makes it possible for us to act under the Idea of freedom (in other words: what grounds our inalienable commitment to a capacity for rational determination of action). It is also connected closely with freedom's axiological dimension, in two ways: if the fact of freedom did not present itself as of a different order from other facts, then it could not matter primitively in the way that it does; and if freedom did not have a subterranean depth, then its unity could not survive the bifurcation into negative and positive conceptions which markedly characterizes theories of freedom.
17
The task which classical German philosophy sets itself is to show that this appearance of depth is not deceptive, not an optical effect of our ignorance of concealed causes. One form that the project takes is the attempt of Fichte (and Hegel) to transform the opacity of freedom into transparency -to illuminate it all the way down.
Accordingly the Wissenschaftslehre seeks to show that the depth of the fact of freedom consists in its being a 'fact' of an extraordinary kind, without parallel, one which makes self and world possible; but which can nonetheless be illuminated fully, because the fact is immanent in self-consciousness. Fichtean illumination. The true opacity in freedom, the real source of its resistance to rational insight, Schelling claims, is our capacity for evil, but from this datum -and by turning our attention away from self-consciousness and towards God sive Nature -we can extrapolate a metaphysics that affords the same level of insight into our existence as free beings as the Wissenschaftslehre claims to do. Thus it may be said indifferently either that the Freiheitsschrift raises the Kantian 'comprehended incomprehensibility' of freedom to a higher power, or that it provides an illumination of freedom as total as the phenomenon allows.
Schelling's approach to freedom is differentiated on the one side, therefore, from the Fichtean-Hegelian claim that speculative reflection can render freedom fully transparent to philosophical reflection, and on the other from the contemporary assumption that freedom, in order to have reality, must yield to analysis in terms of other and plainer concepts already in circulation. But his disagreement with our contemporaries is much greater than with his own. From Schelling's standpoint, the tendency of contemporary defences of freedom, reflecting the anti-speculative philosophical outlook which conditions them, is to superficialize freedom: lacking all conviction in the possibility of metaphysical depth, we find it necessary to suppose that freedom, in order to exist, must be located right at the surface. Accordingly we seek to align it as closely as possible with some antecedently recognized, uncontested and relatively unproblematic feature of our rational lives, on which we take ourselves to already have a firm criteriological grip -responsiveness to reasons, capacity for selfcontrol, governance by second-order volitions, and suchlike. What is puzzling about this endeavour, from the classical German perspective, is the expectation that a concept which carries such an extraordinary weight will allow itself to be identified with a 15 Differently put, it entails that there is truth in indeterminism at the empirical level, whether or not indetermination per se belongs to the essence of freedom. One interesting implication of the all-or-nothing conception is that (some of) the terms employed by natural consciousness to articulate freedom -in particular and most obviously, the 'could have done otherwise' clause and the modal openness of the future -may be legitimate expressions of consciousness of freedom, without being strict conditions of its reality: if freedom is not transparent to natural consciousness, then the conceptual means that we ordinarily employ to signal its realitythough these must be validated in at least an oblique sense -may lack strict truth, and yet not be false or empty. From this it follows, contra the methodology of contemporary discussion, that the issue of the nature and reality of freedom cannot be decided simply by conceptual analysis of the terms in which we ordinarily articulate our conviction of our freedom. 16 While it cannot by any means be said that naturalism is a shared premise of contemporary freedom theorists, it is at least true that, by dint of what it implicitly refuses to countenance as worthy of consideration, the debate is to all effect conducted under pressure from naturalism. Here it needs to be pointed out that, as regards taking seriously the metaphysical implications of natural science, the situation is no different from the 1780s, as the passage from Jacobi shows; what has changed is the perception of philosophical possibilities available for the defence of human freedom -as these have narrowed, so the concept of freedom has been contracted. 17 This feature of the concept's behaviour, the fact that we instinctively grasp freedom on the one hand as an unconditional end, hence as something fully positive, and at the same time represent it in terms of negation, absence of constraint and so forth, without having any clear idea how the two dimensions are connected -a duality that the history of political thought displays on a large scale -is distinctive and ought to be found more puzzling than it is. 18 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60 
